Abstract: The operation of water distribution subsystem (WDS) is inseparably linked with the possibility of occurrence of failures
Introduction
Access to safe drinking-water is essential to health, a basic human right and a component of effective policy for health protection (WHO, 2004) . Water distribution subsystem (WDS) plays one of the most important functions in the whole water supply system (WSS). WDS is a critical infrastructure (Li, et al., 2009) and its main task in the operation is to provide consumers with drinking water in adequate quantity, at the required quality and pressure corresponding to current standards. Due to the large spatial extent, covering the whole area of the water supply, diversity of used materials and their age, WDS is difficult for proper operation. Water-pipe network is expanded technical system and its reliable operation depends on many internal factors (structure, material, conditions of hydraulic flow) (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2006) as well as on external factors (ground and climatic conditions, outside activity of man). Consequences resulting from the impact of these factors are failure events causing unreliability of the entire or part of WDS, which in consequence may lead to a loss of water consumers safety, that should be considered in two aspects: threats resulting from the lack of water or interruption in the supply of water and threats resulting from the possibility of consuming contaminated water (which may cause the loss of life or health of consumers) (Porto, 2004; Rak and Tchórzewska-Cieślak, 2006 ). The main aim of this paper is to present a method for the analysis of failure scenarios in water distribution subsystem using Fault Tree Analysis. The paper contains the characteristics of failure events in WDS and an example of the analysis of failure scenarios using FTA, in order to determine the likelihood of the occurrence of the peak undesirable event (threat to consumers safety as a result of lack of water or restriction in water supply or consuming water with quality that is contrary to the current standard). The analysis used BlockSim 7, by means of which stationary and unstationary values of the likelihood of the occurrence of the peak undesirable event for the built tree, were determined.
Failure events in water distribution subsystem
Failure events in WDS can be divided into:
• failures in water pipes,
• secondary water pollution in water-pipe network. The consequences of these events are:
• lack or breaks of water supply to consumers, • threat to consumers health due to consumption of poor quality water,
• financial losses in waterworks, as a result of costs of failure repairs, washing the network, unsold water or compensations for water consumers, • financial losses of consumers caused by the purchase of bottled water.
Failures in the water-pipe network are a major problem in the process of its operation. Failures of this type concern: the body of the water pipe, connectors or expansion units , fittings (gates, valves, hydrants, vents and drains). They can occur due to the random one-off events, human intervention, or are the result of combined action of time, excessive stress and/or local unfavourable environmental conditions. The reasons for failure of water-pipe network may also be wrongly assumed concept of the structure of the water-pipe network, bad selection of hydraulic conditions of the network (too high working pressure, lack of fittings protecting against hydraulic impacts), the corrosivity of ground, temperature changes). Types of failures in water-pipe network, depending on the material for the network:
• for a network of gray cast iron: the loss of tightness of joints, mechanical damage, • for a network of steel: corrosion, cracks in welds, mechanical damage, • for a network of plastic: connection leak, mechanical damage. The consequences of failure of the water-pipe network may be an interruption in the supply of water for a specified number of consumers or a reduction in pressure in the water-pipe network below the required, resulting in a lack or restriction of water supply to consumers, particularly for those consumers who live on higher floors of buildings. An example of such events in recent years is a failure in main pipeline with a diameter of 1.7 m in Bethesda on the outskirts of Washington, water coming out on the road with a powerful stream caused that several people were "trapped" in their cars, the failure resulted in a reduction of water pressure in the city. The consequence of failure of the water-pipe network may also be the socalled. secondary pollution of water in the water-pipe network, and a particular threat are failures in pipes with large diameters. The hydraulic conditions in WDS contribute to changes in the physical chemical and bacteriological composition of water. An important problem emerging in many urban water supply systems is also significant oversized of water-pipe network, resulting in the decrease of water flow velocity, the silting up of pipelines, and, consequently, adverse conditions of flow that cause the deterioration of water quality in water-pipe network. Microorganisms can get into the distribution system together with treated water (if used dose of disinfectant does not cause total killing of bacteria, viruses and fungi) or as a contaminant from the soil during the failures or repairs of water-pipe network. Substrates for their growth are organic and mineral compounds found in water, the products of corrosion in water pipes and the so-called. dead biomass of organisms found in different types of moss (the so-called biofilm) and internal sludge. Chemical and biological sludge deposited in the water-pipes is a source of secondary pollution, poor hydraulic flow conditions cause that sludge gets directly to tap water. Quantity and the chemical composition of sludge, the type and abundance of microorganisms in biofilm, and a degree of aggressiveness of corrosion water contribute to the level of secondary pollution and a type of released pollutants (Kowal, 2003) . Types of secondary pollution of water in the water-pipe network (Świderska-Bróz and Wolska, 2005):
• contamination by chemicals (most often the products of corrosion of iron and steel), causing an increase in the content of the total iron, an increase in turbidity and colour, or by other compounds. • material of pipes (the susceptibility to corrosion), • significant changes in speed of flow (sludge is washed out )
• low speed of water (stagnant water in water pipes, the increase in water temperature), • rapid change in pressure resulting in local vacuum (sludge is washed out ) • poor technical and sanitary condition of pipes (corrosion of pipes, a large quantity of biofilm, pipes leak), • corrosion caused by aggressive water,
•
pollutants from the ground will pass into water in water-pipe network), • household and industrial devices directly connected to the network (pollution from the installation is sucked into water-pipe network).
Fault tree method
One Fault tree presents graphically the relationship between failure events having impact on the occurrence of a specific undesirable event (eg, lack of water supply for consumers) that is called "a peak event". In drawing up the tree we use the so-called functors (logic gates), specifying, among others, the logical product of events and the logical sum of events. Rules for FTA were specified in the standard (PN-EN 61025:2007). For each failure event "the tree of causes" which could lead to its occurrence is constructed. There are two main types of FTA:
• static -designating a set of causes of the peak event,
• probabilistic-enabling additionally the determination of the likelihood. According to PN-EN 61025 FTA should include:
• defining the scope of the analysis, • functional characteristic of the examined system, • the establishment of assumptions (eg concerning conditions for the functioning of the system, certain simplification of description of processes, the adoption of reliability indexes for elements or their specified state in the case of failure), • identification of dangerous situations (the peak event), • the tree structure,
• logical analysis of interrelation of the elements of the tree, • determination of the direct causes, combining them by a specific logic gate. There are three basic logic gates:
-OR -an event above gate occurs if at least one event below gate occurs (an output event occurs when any of the input events occurs), -AND -an event above gate occurs if all the events below gate occur (an output event occurs if all the input events occur), -VOTE -an event above gate occurs, if m out of the all n events below gate occur (an output event occurs when m out of n input events occur).
• qualitative analysis of the tree is a process to obtain the minimum section of the tree. These are the minimum combinations (products) of the elementary events, leading to the peak event occurrence. They are obtained by applying the methods of Boole's algebra. Logical variable (also called the Boole's variable) takes values from a set of values {0,1}. Arguments of the function correspond to the input states of system, while outputs constitute the value of the function. • quantitative analysis of the tree means the determination of the probability of the primary events, individual sections and the peak event.
The rules to simplify the tree structure:
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• intermediate events with a single input and at least one output, defined by the gates: AND, OR or EXACTLY ONE can be removed from the tree.
• intermediate events with a single output defined by AND or OR gates can be combined with their successors and output events, if the latter are also well defined by AND or OR gates.
• two or more events with multiple outputs and the same successors may be combined into one event, if these events and their successors are all defined by gates AND or by gates OR.
Analysis of failure scenarios in WDS by means of FTA
An example of the application of the fault tree analysis in order to analyse different failure scenarios in WDS, their cause-effect relationship and, in consequence, to calculate the stationary and unstationary likelihood of the peak event occurrence: threat to water consumers safety as a result of lack of water or restriction of water supply, or consumption of poor quality water ). The analysis uses BlockSim 7, which allows the construction of an extended fault tree, taking into account the different scenarios for failure events. Based on research conducted in the Department of Water Supply and Sewage Systems (Tchórzewska-Cieślak and Kalda, 2008) concerning the cause-effect analysis of failure events in WDS, the fault tree, shown in figure 1 , was made.
In the schematic tree a subdiagram (a subtree) of biological contamination was shown as a combination of the following factors: biological and chemical instability, failures and repairs, acts of terrorism, adverse hydraulic conditions, the presence of biofilm The latter two factors must occur simultaneously to cause contamination. The subdiagram is not presented in the paper due to its very large structure. The adopted values of the stationary probabilities of the occurrence of elementary primary events, under the assumption of independence of events, are:
• biological contamination 0. As a result of the fault tree analysis for stationary values of the probability the following results were obtained:
• reliability R (t) = 0.9998, • unreliability F (t) = 0.0002.
BlockSim 7 has also enabled the calculation of unstationary values of the probabilities. In the analysis for the characterization of the likelihood that particular failures will occur, the Weibull's distribution was adopted (Jiang 2009 ). In this distribution the up time distribution has a form:
(1) where:
F(t) -up time distribution , λ -failure rate, α -a distribution parameter, when 0<α< 1 the failure rate function is monotonically decreasing, for α>1 is monotonically increasing, α=1 the Weibull's distribution is transformed into an exponential distribution. In the examined fault tree for individual undesirable events the following parameters of the Weibull's distribution were adopted:
• α=1. 
